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REAL PROPERTY-LANDLORD AND TENANT-NEED FOR LESSEE WHO TRANS-
FERS WHOLE TERM TO BASE RIGHT OF RE-ENTRY ON CONDITION OF "SUB-
STANTIAL ADVANTAGE" TO HIM-Plaintiff lessee transferred his interest in the 
first floor and basement of certain commercial premises for the full remain-
ing period of his own lease, retaining his interest in the second floor, where 
he lived. This transfer was in form a sublease, under which plaintiff as 
sublessor reserved power to cancel the sublease and take possession without 
notice if the premises were used for any purpose other than an off-sale liquor 
store. Plaintiff's transferee later assigned all his interest to defendant cor-
poration, which immediately began converting the premises into an ice 
cream store. After defendant had spent over $10,000 in remodeling, plain-
tiff gave notice that he considered the lease violated, and brought an un-
lawful detainer action to recover possession. The trial court found for 
plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed, with direction to enter judgment for 
defendant. A sublessor who transfers all or part of the premises for the 
full term may reserve a right of re-entry for failure to perform covenants or 
conditions in the sublease.1 This rule applies, however, only if such cove-
nants or conditions contain undertakings of substantial advantage to the 
sublessor. Kostakes v. Daly, (Minn. 1956) 75 N. W. (2d) 191. 
When a lessee transfers his interest in leased premises for the full remain-
ing duration of his own lease under an agreement intended as a sublease, 
the courts have had some difficulty in maintaining a consistent categorization 
of the transferee's interest in terms of Anglo-American tenurial relation-
ships.2 If the original landlord's rights are in issue, such a transfer is almost 
1 Davidson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 158 Minn. 411, 197 N.W. 833 (1924); 
32 A.L.R. 1418 (1924). 
2 See generally Ferrier, "Can There Be a Sublease for the Entire Unexpired Portion 
of a Term?" 18 CALIF. L. REV. I (1929). 
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always held an assignment of the lease, placing the transferee in privity 
of estate with the landlord.8 This privity enables the landlord to assert his 
landlord's remedies against the transferee for the latter's breach of any obli-
gations which run with the leasehold.4 The same result is reached when 
the lessee's entire interest in only a physical part of the premises is trans-
ferred, the legal effect being an assignment pro tanto.~ Under this orthodox 
doctrine, the intended sublease is deemed an assignment because the lessee 
has reserved no part of the duration of the head lease. A reversionary in-
terest in the lessee transferor is required to support a new tenurial relation-
ship, and reservation of a different rent or of a power of re-entry for breach 
of covenants or conditions by the transferee does not usually constitute such 
a reversionary interest. 6 The courts, however, have often allowed a lessee 
to enforce a right of re-entry-essentially a landlord's remedy-against his 
transferee under a "sublease" for the entire remaining term. This result 
may be reached either on the ground that a power of re-entry in the lessee 
is a "contingent reversionary interest" sufficient to support the sublessor-
sublessee relation, 7 or perhaps, more frankly, on the ground that where the 
parties contract for a sublease, their intention to deal as sublessor and 
sublessee should be controlling inter se.8 In the principal case the court was 
3 Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 ill. !HS, 21 N.E. 920 (1889); contra, Davis v. 
Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912); 42 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1084 and note (1913). 
4 32 Atr. JUR., Landlord and Tenant §371 (1941). The landlord also has a cause of 
action against his original lessee, who remains liable for infractions of leasehold obliga-
tions by privity of contract. Oswald v. Fratenburgh, 36 Minn. 270, 31 N.W. 173 (1886). 
5 Wiedemann v. Brown, 190 Minn. 33, 250 ~.W. 724 (1933). See also 99 A.L.R. 
220 (1935). 
6 Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., note 3 supra; 32 AM. JUR., Landlord and Tenant 
§317 (1941). Contra: Dunlap v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161 (1881); Davis v. Vidal, note 3 
supra. Yet even a token reservation of a day or less will prevent the transfer from being 
an assignment for any purpose. See Ferrier, "Can There Be a Sublease for the Entire 
Unexpired Portion of a Term?" 18 CALIF. L. REv. 1 at 17-19 (1929). Also see discussion 
in 8 MINN. L. REv. 609 (1924) pointing out the hyper-technicality of the rule requiring 
a reversionary interest to support the sublessor-sublessee relationship. 
7 Dunlap v. Bullard, note 6 supra; Davis v. Vidal, note 3 supra. Traditionally, a 
right of re-entry is not regarded as an estate in land. See discussion of the problem in 
note, 50 MICH. L. REv. 946 (1952). See also Wallace, "Assignment and Sublease," 8 IND. 
L. J. 359 (1933), showing how courts have undermined the requirement of a reversion 
in the lessee to support a subtenancy between him and his transferee by recognizing 
exceptional contingent apd technical "reversionary interests," in efforts to effectuate the 
contracting parties' intent to create a subtenancy. Shumer v. Hurwitz, 49 Misc. 121, 96 
N.Y.S. 1026 (1905). 
s Coles Trading Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., (9th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 984. See Stewart v. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 102 N.Y. 601, 8 N.E. 200 (1886), where it is pointed out at 
607-608 that classification of a sublease for the entire remaining term as a sublease or 
an assignment may depend upon whether the original lessor's or the lessee's rights are 
being asserted against the transferee. The problem is further complicated in the present 
case by the fact that the defendant was not a party to the contract of sublease, but 
rather is an assignee of the contracting sublessee. The question is thus whether or not 
defendant should be bound by the status of sublessee which his transferor had bargained 
for with the lessee. This extension was made in Davidson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust 
Co., note l supra. Of course the same result follows from the Massachusetts and Texas 
courts' willingness to call a power of re-entry a "contingent reversionary interest,'' note 
7 supra. 
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faced with a clear Minnesota precedent allowing a lessee who had "sublet" 
for the full remaining term to enforce a right of re-entry in the sublease 
against a defendant who had succeeded to the transferee's interest and had 
refused to pay any rent other than that reserved in the head lease.0 The 
court purported to follow this rule, but added that it is applicable only if 
performance of the covenants or conditions would be "of substantial ad-
vantage to the plaintiff [sublessor],"10 and distinguished the principal case 
by deciding as a matter of law that restricting use of the premises to a liquor 
store was not of substantial advantage to plaintiff. The most that can be 
said of this distinction is that it is novel. The result may well be defended 
on its facts,11 but the asserted grounds of decision are untenable. The court 
was apparently unwilling to renounce its prior decision and revert to the 
orthodox approach of denying plaintiff the status of sublessor for lack of a 
recognizable reversionary interest, thereby refusing to enforce his right of 
re-entry against defendant. Such unwillingness is to be commended if based 
on a continued desire to overcome conceptualism in favor of the intent of 
the parties to the sublease.12 Yet the case puts a new obstacle in place of the 
old by requiring the intended sublessor to demonstrate that performance of 
the covenants or conditions elicited from his transferee would be to his "sub-
stantial advantage." This new obstacle cannot help but yield uncertainty. 
To say as a matter of law that a covenant to pay increased rent is, but a 
condition restricting use of premises is not, of "substantial" advantage seems 
more arbitrary than instructive, and undoubtedly will leave a lessee-trans-
feror puzzling over how much and what kind of proof of advantage he must 
offer in order to obtain enforcement of his right of re-entry. Moreover the 
restriction on use of the premises, clearly set out in the sublease defendant 
claimed under, was fully known to all parties.13 The decision in effect 
deprives plaintiff of his right to bargain for what he deemed to be to his 
advantage. It may even be ventured that many might urge as substantially 
advantageous a provision designed to assure the continued existence 
of a liquor store downstairs. At any rate, it is regrettable that the 
court chose this new doctrine rather than reaching the same result upon 
o Davidson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., note I supra. Under the "sublease" in 
that case, the transferee had covenanted to pay the lessee more rent than was reserved 
in the head lease. 
10 Principal case at 194. Note that the court continually refers to the original lessee 
as "sublessor," although it had previously stressed that he was rather an assignor. 
11 The court stressed the unappealing picture presented by the plaintiff, who 
apparently watched defendant's expensive remodeling operations for almost two months 
before notifying defendant that he considered the lease broken by use of the premises 
for other than a liquor store. This was perhaps the real reason motivating the court 
to adopt its new rationale. 
12 See Wallace, "Assignment and Sublease," 8 IND. L. J. 359, especially pp. 384-386 
(1933). 
13 The court's opinion appears to place no significance on the fact that defendant 
was an assignee of the transferee rather than the transferee himself, but see note 8 supra. 
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more candid grounds of estoppel or waiver.14 That would have preserved 
the court's prior approach of looking to the contracting parties' intent to 
create a subtenancy despite feudal concepts of privity, without interjecting 
new and unpredictable prerequisites to relief. 
John A. Beach, S. Ed. 
14 See note 11 supra; Swartz v. Meier, 136 Md. 72, 110 A. 202 (1920); 76 A.L.R. 
304 at 317 (1932). 
